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Lawyer Disciplinary Processes: An Empirical Study of Solicitors’ Misconduct Cases in 
England and Wales in 2015 
 
Andrew Boon∗ and Avis Whyte∗∗ 
 
The Legal Services Act 2007 effected major changes in the disciplinary system for solicitors 
in England Wales. Both the practice regulator, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, and a 
disciplinary body, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, were reconstituted as independent 
bodies and given new powers. Our concern is the impact of the Act on the disciplinary system 
for solicitors. Examination of this issue involves consideration of changes to regulatory 
institutions and the mechanics of practice regulation. Drawing on Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality, empirical evidence drawn from disciplinary cases handled by the SDT and 
the SRA in 2015 is used to explore potentially different conceptions of discipline informing 
the work of the regulatory institutions. The conclusion considers the implications of our 
findings for the future of the professional disciplinary system. 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION  
The Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA) intended to precipitate a revolution in the regulation of 
legal services in England and Wales. The main purpose of the Act was to achieve 
deregulation and liberalisation of the legal services market. Its signal policy was to recognise 
organisations allowing non-lawyer investment and management. This created a legal services 
market regarded as ‘one of the most liberalised in the world’,1 but also demonstrated an 
intention that large corporations rather than small firms of lawyers should provide 
mainstream legal services to ordinary consumers. The de-regulatory process was furthered by 
ending the regulatory role of professional bodies and completely reconfiguring the regulatory 
infrastructure. Various agencies created under the Act promoted a specific kind of regulation 
used in the financial services industry. It seeks to shift regulatory focus, from rules to risks, 
and uses management responsibility to affect business organisation, governance and 
strategy.2 The LSA formed part of a wider process of public and private sector reform, 
designed to bring legal services within the ambit of the regulatory state3 by establishing 
‘responsive regulation’; arrangements geared to symbiotic relationships between state 
regulation and private orderings.4 This article explores what impact neoliberal regulatory 
methods had on lawyers’ disciplinary systems, a key part of a professionalised legal services 
market.  
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The influence of regulation on individual behaviour is a theme of Foucault’s work on the 
transition in criminal sanctions from physical punishment to confinement.5  He observed that 
the introduction of the prison provided the opportunity to use novel technologies of 
surveillance.6 He argued that the techniques of hierarchical observation, normalising 
judgment and their combination in assessment procedures, which he called ‘the 
examination’7  pervade social institutions aiming to affect individual subjectivity. Foucault’s 
theory of governmentality proposes that the self-regulation of the subject using such 
techniques, aims to negate the need for external regulation. Their manifestation in both state 
regulation and attempts to instil self-government on the population8 is particularly marked in 
initiatives across liberal and neoliberal economies. Institutions aim to normalise conduct 
conducive to enterprise, thereby affecting individual self-identity and subjectivity.9 Foucault 
argued that three factors determine the character of systems of social discipline, the system’s 
underlying purposes, its social institutions and the available technology of regulation,10 is 
particularly relevant to the regulation of what was, until 2007, a professionalised legal 
services market.  
 
The LSA effected fundamental change in the first two of Foucault’s three factors, philosophy 
and institution. The philosophy was set out in the first section of the Act declaring, inter alia, 
the regulatory objectives of promoting competition and the consumer interest. The 
institutional changes made by the LSA were intended to reflect a de-regulatory agenda. The 
central thrust was abolition of the regulatory role of professional self-regulating 
organisations. A number of new regulatory institutions were therefore created. These 
included a Legal Ombudsman (LeO) to receive complaints against all regulated lawyers11 and 
a government agency, the Legal Services Board (LSB), answerable to government for 
achieving the Act’s regulatory objectives. The levers of changes to practice regulation were 
in the hands of new ‘front line regulators’ constituted independently of the professional 
bodies. A key mechanism of change was the LSB’s oversight of and influence over these 
institutions. Those responsible for the three main areas of regulation for solicitors, the largest 
legal profession in England and Wales, were the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) and 
the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT).  The SDT was constituted as a professional 
institution in 1974 to hear misconduct allegations against individual practitioners. It changed 
little after the LSA, being relatively insulated from the LSB’s influence. Its raison d’etre is, 
however, potentially at odds with the rationale of the LSA and the regulatory direction taken 
by the SRA. This increasingly reflects a changing logic of regulation.  
 
Freidson identified three regulatory logics and their complementary mechanisms: 
professionalism (collegial control of markets in a spirit of public service), perfect competition 
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(a free market with minimal regulation) and corporate bureaucracy (maximising the 
advantages of effective management).12 The SRA’s regulatory strategy has gradually moved 
away from the policies of professionalism towards those promoting competition and 
corporate bureaucracy.13 In terms of practice regulation, however, the forum for the 
‘modernisation’ of legal services regulation is the modern law firm. The main focus has been 
on a process of ratcheting up the responsibility of law firms for regulation, exemplified by a 
rule book that addresses the employing organisation rather than the individual lawyer. This 
development was anticipated by strand of the legal ethics literature which advocated building 
the ‘ethical infrastructure’ of conventional law firms as a way of addressing lawyer 
misconduct.14 The legal office is also viewed as a site of control of the individual in the 
organisational theory literature, where more subtle mechanisms of control are described.15  
 
Brown and Lewis argue that processes of observation, normalisation and examination, 
processes identified by Foucault as features of modern disciplinary systems, are particularly 
effective in legal workplaces.16 Routines such as time recording potentially define the 
identity of workers even in sectors, such as the professions, characterised by collegiality and 
relatively autonomous work places. Through the process of normalisation the individual 
accepts subjection to their work role and consequent limitations on their autonomy. In this 
approach to regulation ‘[d]isciplinary power is not, or not just sporadic and spectacular, but 
regular and monotonous… the mundane, everyday, repeated patterns of activity which 
characterize processes of (self) organizing’.17 The ability of institutions to perform a 
disciplinary function by affecting the behaviour of the individual employee depends on their 
capacity to provide more effective surveillance and control of regulated populations. The 
legal services market in England and Wales comprises different spheres of solicitors’ 
practice. A broad division between corporate and ‘private plight’ clients, recognised in the 
literature,18 is the basis of very different firm structures. Sole practitioners and small firm 
tend to operate in the private plight sphere and their partners are over-represented in the SDT. 
This is a challenge to a system of regulation based on theories of governmentality.  
 
This article explores the development of the regulatory system of solicitors following the 
LSA. Our account begins by exploring the evolution of the regulatory system following the 
Act. We argue that the shift in the SRA’s regulatory strategy towards corporate bureaucracy 
presents different concepts of discipline in the post-LSA regulatory regime. The themes of 
regulation and governmentality are examined using empirical data on the role of the SRA as a 
practice regulator and prosecuting authority and that of the SDT as adjudicator. In conclusion 
we consider how the nature of risk associated with particular activities of the regulated 
population might determine tools of governance.19 We also consider whether the SDT, in 
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some ways a surprising survivor of the LSA revolution, performs a necessary function. As a 
remnant of a professional regime representing the physical, public and ceremonial 
dimensions of discipline, it arguably sits uneasily in a system based on neoliberal theories of 
regulation.  
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Our data derives from material published by the SRA and material provided to us on the 
overall disposition of investigated cases during 2015.  We also read the full published 
summaries of all 105 cases heard by the SDT 2015,20 yielding data on 132 solicitor 
respondents.21 While such records provide ‘an underutilised window’ on lawyer 
misconduct,22 their form, and hence their usefulness, can vary greatly.23 Hence, gaps remain 
in different aspects of the study.24 The Statistical Package for Social Scientists was used to 
analyse data from the transcripts. Each line of the database represented one SDT case against 
one respondent and contained variables such as, age, sex, the charges, mitigation and 
outcome of the hearing. Quantitative and qualitative data from the SDT records provide both 
an overview of the process and insight into how the tribunal approached cases.25  In addition 
to these two main sources of data, we used web searches on the fate of the firms from which 
respondents before the SDT came26 and other demographic data.27 
 
 
3. THE POST-LSA REGULATORY SYSTEM 
 
(a) Regulatory framework  
In 2007 the Law Society established the SRA as the independent regulator for solicitors, 
responsible for developing the system of practice regulation; in Foucault’s terms the 
‘technology’ of discipline. As practice regulator the SRA is responsible for admissions 
(including educational requirements), the conduct framework and the prosecution of 
misconduct. The LSA specifically provided that the SRA must not allow the Law Society to 
influence its regulatory strategy, which must be geared to supporting the eight regulatory 
objectives of the LSA.28 These include conventional objectives of the professional regulation 
of lawyers, such as supporting the rule of law and promoting and maintaining adherence to 
professional principles but made explicit the need to protect and promote the interests of 
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consumers and competition in the provision of services. Otherwise, regulators were required 
to promote regulatory activity that was transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and 
targeted only at cases in which action was needed.29  
 
The SDT was originally established under the Solicitors Act 1974 ‘at the [Law] Society’s 
request and in the public interest’.30 It was introduced at the same time as the Law Society 
acquired power to make disciplinary rules and investigate their breach,31 make account 
rules32 and intervene in solicitors’ practices.33   The Act arguably marked the height of an age 
in which the ideology of professionalism prevailed. Even twenty years later Sir Thomas 
Bingham MR, canvassing reasons for striking a solicitor from the roll in Bolton v The Law 
Society, 34 identified ‘the most fundamental of all: to maintain the reputation of the solicitors' 
profession as one in which every member, of whatever standing, may be trusted to the ends of 
the earth’.35 The role of the SDT did not change following the LSA. Its power to strike 
respondents from the roll of solicitors, arguably the essential professional power,36 was 
traditionally exercised when it was necessary to protect the integrity of the professional body. 
Inevitably, such exclusion often came long after harm had been suffered by consumers or 
others. The philosophy of regulation represented by such tribunals therefore appears to be at 
odds with the consumer orientated objectives of the LSA and with the broader interest of the 
state in ‘markets which are fair, efficient, orderly and clean’.37 
 
The LSA enhanced the powers of both the SDT and the SRA, but in a way that made them 
potential competitors for jurisdiction. The Act removed a restriction on the upper limit of fine 
the SDT could impose38 but gave the SRA new powers to issue written rebukes and impose 
fines of up to £2,000 on individual practitioners. These new powers of sanction, albeit minor, 
potentially deflected cases from the SDT. This may have been relatively unproblematic had 
the LSA not also given the SRA rights to fine new entities created by the LSA, Alternative 
Business Structures (ABS), up to £250 million and individuals working in them up to £50 
million. The discrepancy in the power to fine solicitor practitioners and entities and their 
employees appeared illogical, spurring the SRA to seek to extend its power to fine solicitors 
on the grounds of consistency.39 If it were to be successful the SDT would effectively be left 
with striking off and suspension as its exclusive powers. The incremental extension of the 
SRA’s powers therefore poses an existential threat to the SDT. 
 
(b) Regulatory policy 
The SRA promised a regulatory regime placing public and consumer interests at its heart.40 It 
would overhaul regulatory practice and forge a new relationship with regulated parties, adopt 
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40 SRA Handbook 2011 (as amended): Introduction, para 3.  
risk-based strategies, a more proactive and preventative approach and ‘focus resources on 
problem firms’.41A significant step in the evolution of the new regime, publication of a new 
regulatory rulebook, occurred in 2011.  The SRA Handbook retained six core duties in the 
previous code and added a further four primarily focused on running legal businesses. It 
presented these as ten mandatory principles defining ‘the fundamental ethical and 
professional standards that we expect of all firms (including owners who may not be lawyers) 
and individuals when providing legal services’.42 As part of the Handbook, a new code of 
conduct reframed the rules in the previous code as ‘Outcomes’ to be achieved and ‘Indicative 
Behaviours’, examples of how they might be. The format represented a radical departure 
from the Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007, which was based on more conventional rules. This 
introduced some ambiguity in the behaviour expected of professionals since, in theory, there 
were various possible ways of achieving Outcomes.   
 
The SRA Handbook resulted from several pressures. Prior to the LSA the Law Society had 
asked consultants to advise on regulation; both advocated a form of ‘principles based 
regulation’, the system used to regulate the financial industry.43  Further, the oversight 
regulator, the LSB, specified that licensing authorities for ABS companies potentially owned 
and run by non-lawyers, should also use that system. The Law Society had reservations about 
the SRA proposal to use the system as a framework for regulating ABS and individual 
solicitors. It argued that under rule-based systems:   
 
‘…solicitors are able to rely without hesitation upon uniformity of practice across the 
profession where it comes to issues such as conflict, confidentiality and undertakings. 
This enables routine commercial transactions to proceed smoothly and economically. 
This requires a set of quickly and easily enforceable obligations that sanction any 
failure to adhere to professional obligations... [T]he proposed rules as they currently 
stand contain a myriad of reporting requirements. We are concerned that this will 
mean that the SRA will be overwhelmed with reports under the various different rules 
as solicitors either misinterpret the requirements or take a risk averse approach to 
reporting.’44  
 
Despite these reservations the SRA went ahead. Thus, traditional solicitors’ firms, even sole 
practitioners, were required to appoint a Head of Legal Practice and a Head of Finance,45 
compliance posts required by the LSA for ABS.   
 
The SRA’s system imposed significant new responsibilities on firms for regulating the 
conduct of the solicitors they employed. One of the ten principles was that ‘[you] comply 
with your legal and regulatory obligations and deal with your regulators and ombudsmen in 
an open, timely and co-operative manner’.46 A new chapter, ‘You and Your Regulator’, 
appeared in the Handbook’s Code of Conduct. 47 This included sub-rules from the previous 
                                                 
41 See e.g. SRA The Architecture of Change – Part 2 (2010) para 16; available at 
www.sra.org.uk/documents/sra/consultations/handbook/october-consultation-paper.doc (accessed 4 May 2018). 
42 Above n 40, para 3 (a).  
43 Lord Hunt of Wirral The Hunt Review of the Regulation of Legal Services (London: Law Society, 2009) and 
N Smedley Review of the Regulation of Corporate Legal Work (London: Law Society, 2009), although Smedley 
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response (London: Law Society, January 2011) p.4. 
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46 SRA Handbook. above n 40, Principle 7. 
47 SRA Code of Conduct 2011, Chapter 10. 
code48 requiring regulated parties to notify the SRA promptly of serious financial difficulty 
or failure to comply with or achieve the principles and other requirements of the Handbook49 
and to inform the SRA of serious misconduct.50  
 
The subtle shift in regulatory method could be seen as a move from the regulatory logic of 
professionalism towards corporate bureaucracy. This, theoretically at least, offers regulators a 
range of different disciplinary technologies aimed at increasing employee commitment, 
motivation, performance and behaviour.51 Within firms the possibilities include conventional 
methods such as hierarchical management and surveillance, but might also include 
incentives.52 These techniques can be seen as part of a process ‘responsibilisation’, an aspect 
of governmentality whereby regulated populations are encouraged to rationally choose new 
ways of conducting themselves.53 External regulation increasingly assumes and builds on the 
responsibility of the regulated population. We see examples of this in requirements that 
entrants assess their own suitability to enter the profession, assess and confirm their own 
training needs and form their own continuing professional development programme.54 
 
The changes outlined could be interpreted as a refinement of professional methodology, but 
proposals for education and training of solicitors suggest a decisive change in regulatory 
strategy. Professionalism uses an intensive and common initial phase of education and 
training to both select suitable individuals and socialise them into a collegial social group.55 
Individual discipline largely depends on personal self-regulation, group identification and 
peer pressure. Formal discipline, as represented by the SDT, is directed at irredeemable 
failures of the socialisation process. The SRA is adopting policies that incrementally move 
away from the collegial strategies of professionalism. Perhaps the most fundamental of these 
is the proposal that prospective solicitors need only pass a Solicitors Qualifying Examination 
(SQE). One of the espoused advantages of removing requirements to take prescribed 
undergraduate and vocational courses56 is that future solicitors will begin their careers, not in 
traditional law firms, having taken law degrees, but in corporate employment or as 
beneficiaries of corporate patronage, having an undergraduate degree or equivalent 
experience.57 This continues a development already seen in the form of bespoke, firm 
                                                 
48 Ibid R.20.03 and R.20.04. 
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52 For example, Axiom, promotes itself as being a global leading alternative legal services provider, at the 
forefront of a new era of legal services. It rewards employees with a form of equity, stock awards, for 
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targets, see https://www.axiomlaw.com (accessed 23 March 2018). See also Binham, above n 1. 
53 T Lemke ‘Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique’ (2010) 14(3) Rethinking Marxism 49. 
54 SRA Annual Review 2015/16 (London and Birmingham: SRA, 2016); available at 
http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work/reports/annual-review/annual-review-2015-16.page (accessed 20 
October 2017). 
55 MS Larson The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley CA: University of California 
Press, 1977) and Freidson, above n 12. 
56 SRA A New Route to Qualification: The Solicitors Qualifying Examination (2017); available at 
https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/consultations/solicitors-qualifying-examination.page#download (accessed 4 May 
2018) 
57 The SQE will ‘validate different routes to qualification, including ‘earn as you learn’ pathways such as 
apprenticeships’, see news release ‘SRA announces new solicitors assessment to guarantee high standards’ 
25 April 2017; available at https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/news/press/sqe-ensure-high-consistent-standards.page 
(accessed 17 March 2018). 
sponsored vocational courses.58 It potentially replaces the professional ideal of a common 
educational experience with induction into the culture of a specific organisation.   
 
(c) Disciplinary tribunal references and alternative disposals  
In terms of practice regulation, references to the SDT are the tip of a much larger framework. 
Unlike many lawyer discipline systems,59 the solicitors system does not deal with consumer 
complaints, which are the province of the LeO. Nevertheless, in 2015/16 the SRA received 
around 11,000 reports about solicitors and businesses it regulates.60 Approximately 9.6% 
(1,079) of these were referred to LeO,61 but the remainder were assessed in order to decide 
whether or not there should be further investigation, usually by examination of the practice 
files and accounts, by the SRA’s Forensic Investigation Unit (FIU).62  
 
Although the Law Society had used a power to impose conditions on practising certificates as 
a way of dealing with some cases of misconduct, the new powers to rebuke or fine extended 
its options. From 2007 the SRA also made more extensive use of regulatory settlement 
agreements (RSAs) under which solicitors could even agree to being struck off, denying them 
their livelihood. In 2015 restrictions were imposed on practising certificates in 24 cases.63 
Additionally, the SRA upheld 286 allegations resulting in 140 letters of advice, 26 warnings, 
43 rebukes or reprimands and 16 fines.64 A further 199 allegations were referred to the SRA’s 
legal directorate with the intention that disciplinary proceedings should be issued. The fact 
that these referrals resulted in only 105 cases is explained by the fact that some were 
rescinded, or led to a RSA, or that multiple investigations led to just one hearing.65  
 
The SRA claims to draw upon a wide range of sources in identifying risks to regulatory 
outcomes, ‘including reports we receive, intelligence-gathering while supervising firms, 
contacting consumers directly and monitoring markets and the economy’.66 The majority of 
reports the SRA received for the year November 2015 to October 2016, came from members 
of the public and, at 56.2% (n. 6,337), was almost double that received from the profession 
(23.1%, n. 2,602).67 The SRA’s internal sources made up 11.6% (n. 1,304) of referrals, half 
of that received from the profession.68  The balance (c.10%) comprised reports from 
                                                 
58 See, for example, Legal Week City LPC: The Elite Mould 25 Oct 2004; available at 
http://www.legalweek.com/sites/legalweek/2004/10/25/city-lpc-the-elite-mould/?slreturn=20180404061330 and 
Law Society Gazette Controversial City LPC consortium splits as firms opt for different providers 25 March 
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different-providers/41684.article (accessed 4 May 2018). 
59 LC Levin, ‘Building a Better Lawyer Discipline System: The Queensland Experience’ (2006) 9 Legal Ethics 
187. 
60 SRA Annual Review 2015/16, above n 54, p 30. 
61 Ibid, 33. 
62 The Unit carries out the SRA’s investigatory function, see http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/equality-
diversity/impact-assessments/forensic-investigation.page (accessed 16 October 2017). 
63 Freedom of Information Request SRA/0188. 
64 Freedom of Information Request SRA/0174. 
65 Ibid. 
66 SRA SRA Regulatory Risk Framework (SRA, 2014) p 3; available at http://www.sra.org.uk/risk/risk-
framework.page (accessed 23 March 2018). 
67 According to the SRA Annual Review 2015/16, above n 54, p 31 the SRA receives around 11,000 reports per 
annum from the profession, e.g., compliance officers or solicitors, the public, the police and the courts. We 
contacted the SRA and asked for a detailed breakdown of the reporting figures, which they provided via email 
on 12th April 2018.  
68 SRA email, ibid. The remaining sources of reports to the SRA came from anonymous sources (1.7%), 
government departments (1.4%), the police (0.9%), insurers (0.5%), banks (0.4%), other regulators (0.3%), 
courts (0.2%), the press (0.1%), trainees (0.1%) and students (0.1%). 
institutions, the main provider being the LeO (3.4% of the overall total). The record of SDT 
cases indicate four main ways in which respondents came to attention. First, in 35 of the 105 
cases prosecution followed investigatory audits of accounts and files by FIU. It was not 
always clear what prompted these investigations, but they could have resulted from solicitors’ 
failure to comply with regulatory requirements such as providing information or filing 
accounts. Second, in 31 cases the matter was referred by the firm or by the party guilty of 
misconduct.  Third, in 17 cases the matter was reported by clients (for example, mortgage 
lenders) insurers, opponents, other solicitors or the Legal Ombudsman (LeO). Finally, there 
were 15 cases involving criminal convictions where the SRA may have been alerted by news 
reports or judicial referral. 
 
Auditing and self/firm reporting could provide evidence of the success of the SRA’s 
regulatory strategy, such as the 35 cases (33%) where prosecution followed investigatory 
audits of accounts and files by FIU. While in most cases it was unclear what triggered the 
audits, they could be prompted by failure to comply with new information requirements.69 
These were introduced to enable the SRA to assess risks, identify failure to meet the 
outcomes70 and deal with instability or financial failure, fraud and dishonesty.71  A clearer 
example of success is the 31 (29.5%) cases in which misconduct was reported by the firm, or 
their reporting accountants,72 or by the guilty party. These are arguably evidence of the 
success of the introduction of compliance posts and reporting requirements. 
 
(d) Prosecution 
Although consumers can bring cases to the SDT they cannot obtain compensation. This, 
combined with the difficulty of bringing a case, is probably why nearly all cases are 
prosecuted and presented by the SRA. In 2015/16 over 5,50073 cases sent for investigation by 
the SRA’s Risk Centre Assessment Team74 resulted in only 129 referrals by the SRA to the 
SDT.75 Referring only 2.3% of investigated cases might manifest excessive concern about the 
risk of losing.76 In 2015 the SRA succeeded in all but two of the cases it prosecuted before 
the SDT77 and in criminal matters moderate levels of dismissal are taken as signifying that 
appropriate risks are taken.78 A second explanation of the large gap between reports and 
cases, and the general long term decline in the caseload of the SDT,79 is that the SRA made 
appropriate use of its disciplinary powers to make alternative disposals. 
 
                                                 
69 See, for example, Malcolm Ronald Hannaford (11085-2012). 
70 SRA Architecture of change, above n 41, para 157.  
71 Ibid, para 158.  
72 The firm’s reporting accountants reported in four cases, see, for example, William John Owen (11068/2012) 
and Jeremy Simon Barker & Michelle Jane Newton (11327-2015). 
73 SRA Annual Review 2015/16, above n 54, p 33. 
74 See http://www.sra.org.uk/risk/reports-assessment-method.page (accessed 16 October 2017). 
75 SRA Annual Review 2015/16, above n 54, p 17. 
76 M Lonakan ‘Self-regulation in the Canadian securities industry: Funnel in, funnel out, or funnel away?’ 
(2105) 43 IJLCJ 456.  
77 In the first the charges were not made out (Ademuyiwa Olusesan Ogunnowo (11317/2015) and in the second 
the tribunal complained that the prosecution had not matched the evidence to the charges against multiple 
respondents, Heer Manak Solicitors, Kulwant Singh Manak, Robin Heer, Balbir Singh Dahil, Pritpal Chahal, 
Rajbinder Kaur Dhillon (11165-2013).  
78 A Ashworth ‘Ethics and Criminal Justice’ in R Cranston (ed) Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
79 The SRA Annual Review 2015/16, above n 54, p 37 notes that the 129 SDT referrals in 2015/16 were a 34% 
increase in cases referred in the previous two years (2014/15 saw 96 referrals and 2013/14 saw 97) but that this 
increase was a result of a full case review rather than being reflective of a spike in concerns for this year.  
 
e) Misconduct  
In 2015, 66 of the 105 cases (62.9%) presented to the SDT involved financial impropriety. 
These cases could be broadly divided into cases where the solicitor acted against the client’s 
interests and cases where the solicitor was implicated, deliberately or not, in a client fraud. Of 
the 25 cases involving fraud in our sample, 19 involved solicitor fraud on clients. Actions 
against the best interests of clients may also involve a breach of the Solicitors’ Accounts 
Rules (SAR). Of the 66 cases of financial impropriety, 40 (60.6%) were simply breaches of 
the SAR. This preponderance of cases is probably because SAR offences were generally 
strict liability and the easiest to prove using accounting records. The SAR required that all 
client money was held in a separate client account until it could be legitimately transferred to 
the solicitor’s office account on delivery of a bill.80  
 
Using client money to pay office expenses or to fund another client’s matter, a practice 
known in bookkeeping as ‘teeming and lading’, occurred in several cases, generally when 
firms suffered cash flow problems.81 Such conduct showed reckless disregard of the risk of 
losing the client’s money if, eventually, the firm collapsed. Accordingly, withdrawal from 
client account for any purpose other than payment of a delivered bill or to return it to a client, 
was treated as a serious breach. Nevertheless, the SRA dealt with some breaches of the SAR 
in which there was no dishonesty under a RSA rather than by reference to the SDT.82  
 
There were only six cases in which the respondent was implicated in their client’s fraud. In 
four of these they acted knowingly, but in a further two they were ignorant of their clients’ 
intentions. These relatively small numbers fail to highlight significant concern regarding 
active solicitor involvement in money laundering. In one notorious case a sole practitioner 
was caught in the Financial Conduct Authority’s Operation Cotton, which examined the 
activities of land banking companies.83 Other examples occurred when solicitors apparently 
allowed their client account to be used as a bank, that is, without there being an underlying 
transaction. In such cases there may be a suspicion of money laundering but no clear proof of 
illegal activity.84Although the SDT identified this issue in 200285 the code of conduct only 
specifically addressed it 2011.86  
 
Another relatively large category of case indirectly involved firms unable to secure 
professional indemnity insurance (PII). This followed from the SRA’s 2011 decision to close 
the Assigned Risks Pool, the safety net for solicitors’ firms unable to obtain client liability 
insurance on the open market.87 Eight of the 105 cases, involving 13 respondents, concerned 
                                                 
80 SRA Solicitor Account Rules, 13 and 17; see 
http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/accountsrules/part4/content.page (accessed 17 October 2017). 
81 See for example Selcuk Karatas (11258/2014), Richard Arnold Wilkes (11281-2014) and Gerard Christopher 
Mann and Katherine Jane Bradford (11251-2014). 
82 Beeley, Nancy Kan-Hai (Agreement 2nd November 2016) (deficit of nearly £50,000 on client account 
remedied after a month – respondent rebuked and fined £2,000).  
83  Dale Robert Walker (11254-2014), see further the FCA ‘Eight convicted for roles in unauthorised collective 
investment scheme’ 1 June 2015; available at http://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/eight-convicted-role-
unauthorised-collective-investment-scheme (accessed 16 October 2017).  
84 See, for example, Mark Stanley Agombar (111092-2012), fined £15,000 and Daniel Gidon Zysblat (11222-
2014), suspended for two years. 
85 Michael William Robert Wood & Alan Burdett (8669-2002). 
86 SRA Code of Conduct 2011, Rule 15, note (ix) and see SRA Account Rules r.14.5. 
87 The ARP was abolished in October 2013. See, SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules 2012 as amended by the SRA 
Indemnity Insurance Rules 2013; available at 
http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/indemnityins/content.page and R Collins ‘Why the SRA Replaced 
solicitors charged with PII connected offences: making false insurance declarations,88 failing 
to obtain insurance, failing to notify the SRA of the firm entering into an extended indemnity 
period or failing to close their businesses within the specified cessation period.89  
 
The balance of the SDT’s 2015 caseload comprised cases in which respondents were 
convicted of criminal offences prior to the SDT hearing. These cases involved a disparate 
range of offences, but one category seemed reasonably clear:  misleading others about 
mistakes. Cases included those against partners who had concealed mistakes from clients by, 
for example, faking emails to the court having failed to list a case,90 or misled them about the 
stage their case had reached.91 In similar cases involving associate solicitors, failure to 
register a charge,92 missed court deadlines93 or forged letters and medical reports,94 the 
respondents also concealed mistakes from their firm.  Another small category of case 
involved solicitors conspiring to assist illegal immigration95 and misleading the court in 
litigation proceedings.96 
 
It has been seen that the misconduct considered by the SDT in 2015 largely involved 
financial impropriety, from fraud to inadequate book-keeping, which may or may not involve 
dishonesty. A smaller category of cases potentially involved other kinds of dishonesty such as 
misleading clients or the courts. Finally, a residue involved a breach of the requirement for 
professional indemnity insurance, which may or may not involve dishonesty. In considering 
whether these kinds of cases are due to regulatory failings, and if so the nature of such 
failings, it is helpful to consider the offender profile.       
 
(f) Respondent profiles  
The profile of respondents appearing before the SDT in 2015 supports some generalisations 
regarding risk factors. Graph 1, depicting the age of the 132 respondents before the SDT, 
suggests that the likelihood of appearance before the SDT peaks in middle age. It is important 
to note that this impression can be misleading for two reasons. The first is that offences can 
occur many years before misconduct is discovered. In 34 cases, over a quarter of the whole, 
the date of the first act of misconduct recorded in the transcript, what we have called the first 
infraction date (FID), occurred within the first ten years of practice and in a further 31 cases 
within 11 to 20 years PQE. The second reason concerns late admission.  The current mean 
age for first admission to the Roll is 29.597 but large numbers of respondents were admitted 
late: 21 (17.5%) when they were aged between 30 and 39, 14 (11.7%) when they were 
between 40 and 49 and three (2.5%) when they were 50 or over.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Assigned Risks Pool’ LSG 21 July 2011; available at http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/why-the-sra-
replaced-the-assigned-risks-pool/61455.article (accessed 16 October 2017). 
88 Christakis Pittordou (11316-2014), failure to disclose investigation by SRA in application for PII. 
89 See, for example, David Alan Eager (111300-2014), Ian Robert Gannicott (11308-2014), Justin Philip Huntly 
Nelson (11304-2014) and Rebecca Sabena Asghar, Mohammed Ekramulhoque Mazumder & Mohammed 
Mazibur Rahman (11333/2015).  
90 Matthew Albert Timmis (11193-2013), fined £10,000.  
91 For example, Duncan John Dollimore (11303-2014) and Mark Christopher Ungoed Davies (11345-2015). 
92 Eve Clare Carlile (11247-2014).  
93 Duncan Hugh Ranton (11263-2014).  
94 Claire Louise Tunstall (11289-2014).  
95 See, for example, Chika Emmanuel Ike-Michael (11233-2014), struck off, Nazakat Ali (11275/2014), struck 
off and Syed Tanweer Akhtar & Benny Thomas (11262-2014), Akhtar was reprimanded and Thomas was struck 
off. 
96 See for example, William John Gregory Osmond (11355/2015) and Paul Geoffrey Dean Smith (11358/2015). 
97 The Law Society, above n 27, p 46. 
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In the majority of cases we were able to identify the practices that respondents came from.98 
The largest organisation at which a respondent worked consisted of 60 partners,99 but this 
was exceptional. Over 70% of SDT cases were against respondents from sole or small 
practices, those with four partners or fewer. Table 1 appears to support the contention that 
principals, sole practitioners and partners, are disproportionately engaged in misconduct 
compared to their number in the general population of solicitors.  In 2015 partners or their 
equivalent100 comprised 43% (n.57) of respondents but only 31.5% of the total population of 
practising solicitors, and sole practitioners 23.5% of SDT respondents (n.31) but only 4.6% 
of the population of practising solicitors. These data suggest a negative association between 
the size of firm in which respondents were employed and appearance before the SDT. 
 
TABLE 1: INSERT ABOUT HERE (Table 1: Respondents’ employment status compared 
with number with that status in the general population)101 
 
 General Population SDT 
Sole Practitioners n.4,157 4.6% n.31 23.5% 
2—4 Partners n.8,885 9.8% n.40 30.3% 
5—10 Partners n.4,951 5.4% n.7 5.3% 
                                                 
98 We identified 32 sole practices and 44 partnerships, leaving 29 firms unaccounted for. Sole practitioners were 
identifiable from SDT records and other partnership data. We also gleaned data from the firm’s website, the 
Law Society’s “find a firm” database; available at http://solicitors.lawsociety.org.uk and the SRAs “Law Firm 
Search” ; available at http://www.sra.org.uk/consumers/using-solicitor/law-firm-search.page (accessed 20 
October 2017). These sources provide details of the situation in 2015, rather than the time at which the offences 
occurred.  
99 Based in the London office of Fieldfisher LLP. It was a partner at the London office who was brought before 
the tribunal, see Bartholomew Michael John Harte (11329-2015).   
100 Respondents use various new terminology, such as ‘director’ or ‘equity member’. 
101 The Law Society, above n 27, p 29, Table 4.3. 
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individually and cumulatively by decade
Frequency Frequency in Decades
11—25 Partners n.3,531 3.9% n.6 4.5% 
26—80 Partners n.4,102 4.5% n.4 3% 
80+ Partners n.7,225 7.9%   
Associates/Assistants n.43,203 47.4% n.36 27.3% 
Others n.15,008 16.4% n.8 6.1% 
 
Total 
 
91,062 
 
100% 
 
132 
 
100% 
 
 
In 19 cases of the 105 cases in our sample, more than one member of staff was involved in 
alleged misconduct: one case involved six co-respondents from the same firm,102 one 
involved five (one of which was a recognised body), three involved three and 14 cases 
involved two. In two of these cases employers were held responsible for failing to ensure 
staff complied with the code of conduct.103 A follow-up search of firms established that 
nearly 62% (n.58) of the 105 firms associated with respondents in 2015 became defunct.104 
The cause of this high figure may be that appearance before the SDT was either a symptom 
of practice breakdown or a result of key personnel being struck off.   
 
An explanation of why disciplined lawyers come from small firms is that they are targeted by 
regulators and do not respond adequately.105 While there is limited evidence of bias against 
small units, reviews by or for the SRA lend credence to this hypothesis. In 2008 an 
independent review found probable institutional racism in the selection of black and minority 
ethnic (BAME) solicitors for disciplinary prosecutions.106 In 2014, the John report suggested 
non-discriminatory reasons why BAME solicitors were more likely to appear in disciplinary 
cases.107 Whereas, on average, white solicitors set up on their own after 19 years of practice, 
BAME solicitors, motivated by frustration, lack of career opportunities or a desire to serve 
their community, went solo six years after qualification. 108 The report suggested that these 
kinds of sole practices were more likely to be monitored by the SRA109 and not to have the 
resources to “ensure best practice and insulate themselves against litigation”.110 Moreover, 
the lack of experience of the principals meant that, once challenged, they were more likely to 
come into conflict with the SRA. John found disproportionate treatment of BAME solicitors 
at three stages of the regulatory process. They were more likely to have cases raised or 
complaints registered against them, to be investigated, and be severely sanctioned (on which 
                                                 
102 Three partners, two assistant solicitors and their firm, Heer Manak Solicitors et al, above n 80. 
103 Joe Ezaz, Darren James Dale & Richard Spector (11151-2013) and Alexander Henry Bevan & Guy Robin 
Hollebon (11236/2014). 
104 The percentages quoted here are valid percentages based on a total population of 94 firms. Firm information 
was missing in 11 cases. 
105 LC Levin ‘The Ethical World of Solo and Small Firm Practitioners’ (2004) 41 Hous LR 309. 
106 Lord Ouseley found institutional racism highly probable, see Independent Review into Disproportionate 
Regulatory Outcomes for Black and Minority Ethnic Solicitors (London: SRA, 2008); available at 
http://www.sra.org.uk/documents/SRA/equality-diversity/ouseley-report.pdf (accessed 20 October 2017). 
107 G John Independent Comparative Case Review: The Solicitors Regulation Authority (London: Gus John 
Consultancy Limited, 2014); available at http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/equality-diversity/reports/independent-
comparative-case-review.page (accessed 20 October 2017). 
108 Ibid, p 13, para 1.30. 
109 Ibid, p 14, para 1.33.  
110 Ibid, p 11, para 1.26.  
see below), when compared to white solicitors.111 The report warned against jumping to 
conclusions of institutional racism, citing complex ‘socio-economic and political factors’ as 
contributors to disproportionality.112  
 
One aspect of these findings, an absence of resources to ensure best practice and insulate 
against litigation, apply to many solo and small firm lawyers. However, it might be argued 
that these factors only call into question selection for prosecution decisions where dishonesty 
is not involved. Lack of resources may be relevant in some types of SDT case, for example, 
those where there is ‘borrowing’ from client account to pay office expenses or failure to 
obtain professional indemnity insurance. As we have seen, some of these cases, particularly, 
use of client money, can be labelled dishonest when motivation is difficult to determine.  
 
Another factor that may be relevant in solo and small firm transgression is opportunity.113 
Junior lawyers and women are, it is said, under-represented because of structural position 
rather than propensity.114 An important dimension is lack of oversight, a theory that explains 
the persistence of the generalisation that older males from small firms115 or solo practices116 
are the subjects of lawyer discipline. On this view, offending is promoted by the nature of 
solo and small practice: lawyers with control of office finances, clients with whom lawyers 
have no continuing relationship and little incentive to serve diligently,117 low pay, low levels 
of finance, inadequate staffing and sporadic supervision. These conditions provide motive, 
opportunity and classic conditions for white collar crime.118 Health and dependency 
problems, often linked to depression or stress,119 may also play a part. These are factors 
which lack of adequate workplace support probably exacerbate.120 
 
The fact that a large population of active practitioners continues to produce relatively few 
disciplinary cases is consistent with earlier studies.121 Indeed, our data suggests a long term 
reduction in SDT cases since the change of regulator. The fact that only a third of potential 
                                                 
111 Ibid, p 9, para 1.14. The Ouseley report, above n 106 and Pearn Kandola, Solicitors’ Regulation Authority 
Commissioned Research into issues of disproportionality 2010; available at http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/equality-
diversity/reports/research-disproportionality.page (accessed 26 April 2018). 
112 John, above n 110, p 11, para 1.25. 
113 JW Coleman ‘Competition and Motivation to White-Collar Crime’ in N Shover and JP Wright Crimes of 
Privilege: Readings in White Collar Crime (NY, Oxford: OUP, 2001) 341.  
114 Abel above n 22, p 41, and see T Sklar, Y Taouk, D Studdert, M Spittal, R Paterson and M Bismark 
‘Characteristics of Lawyers Who are Subject to Complaints and Misconduct Findings’ (20 January 2018); 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2988411 (accessed 15 February 2018).  
115 HW Arthurs ‘Why Canadian Law Schools Do Not Teach Legal Ethics’, in K Economides (ed) Ethical 
Challenges to Legal Education and Conduct (Oxford: Hart, 1998), L Haller ‘Solicitors' Disciplinary Hearings in 
Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis’ (2001) 13 Bond LR 1, F Bartlett ‘Professional Discipline 
Against Female Lawyers in Queensland: A Gendered Analysis’ (2008) 17 GLR 301 and Piquero et al, above n 
25. 
116 See review of the literature in Abel, above n 22, ch 1, pp 54-56 and particularly, JE Carlin Lawyers on Their 
Own: A Study of Individual Practitioners in Chicago (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1962). M 
Davies ‘The regulation of solicitors and the role of the solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal’ (1998) 14 PN 143, 
found that over 50% of SDT respondents were sole practitioners but Piquero et al (ibid, p 575) suggest that the 
evidence from other jurisdictions is equivocal. 
117 Abel, above n 22, p 52. 
118 Ibid, pp 28-52. 
119See further J Moore, D Buckingham and K Diesfield ‘Disciplinary Tribunal Cases Involving New Zealand 
Lawyers with Mental or Physical Impairment (2015) 22:5 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 649. 
120 Indeed, LawCare, established as SolCare in 1997, focuses on helping with addiction, mental health and well-
being issues; see http://www.lawcare.org.uk/about-us (accessed 16 October 2017). 
121 M Davies ‘The Regulatory Crisis in the Solicitors Profession’ (2003) 6:2 Legal Ethics 185, p 216. 
misconduct cases reached the SDT may, however, be misleading. The evidence suggests that 
the many matters not referred to the SDT are now being processed and dealt with by 
alternative disposals rather than simply abandoned. Despite this, the high success rate at the 
SDT, similar to that of SROs, may suggest that the SRA is over-cautious in making 
prosecution decisions. This is a particular concern given the risk that those SDT cases in 
which solicitors were involved in client fraud could be the tip of a much larger iceberg.  
 
The possibility of undetected fraud could lead to unexpected and large claims on the 
Compensation Fund maintained for victims of solicitors’ fraud.122 It could also lead to costly 
interventions by the SRA. In 2013 the SRA had to intervene in 47 practices.123 Because there 
was no other source of funding the cost of intervention, around £17 million, fell on the 
Compensation Fund.124  Since 2013 there has been a downward trend in the number of SRA 
interventions and thus savings to the compensation fund. So, in 2015/16 the authority 
intervened in 37 practices125 with a cost to the compensation fund of £10.3m.126 This may 
justify a more intensive focus on some parts of the market.127 Our data suggests that size of 
firm is most consistently linked with misconduct cases before the SDT.128 It is not known 
whether detection and investigation strategies in relation to small units are adequate or 
sufficiently proactive. At present, it appears that the only regulatory strategies that might 
target such problems are increased monitoring and increased information requirements on 
firms. Details are difficult to find and it may be that the techniques may not detect well 
organised fraudsters. Despite the apparent success of the reporting requirements we found 
little evidence in the transcripts of new or improved monitoring by the SRA.  
 
Our assessment of the SRA’s broad regulatory strategy suggests that it is ill-suited to the 
most salient problems of regulation. It is geared to organisations with significant 
infrastructure, not to the solo and small practices comprising the majority of organisations in 
which solicitors’ work. One solution would therefore to be to require a minimum size of 
practice, but this could severely restrict access to legal services, particularly in areas of low 
population density. Because of the difficulty of making private practice conform to its 
regulatory model, the SRA must also rely on the disciplinary apparatus inherited from the 
Law Society. This system, based on monitoring and investigation, was geared to the use of 
specific professional rules of conduct. The abandonment of a conventional rule book causes 
difficulty in both prosecuting cases and in adjudicating on cases brought to the SDT. 
 
 
4. ADJUDICATION 
                                                 
122 See Hannaford, above n 69, which resulted in a £700, 000 claim on the Compensation Fund. 
123 See page 3 of the SRA Regulatory Outcomes Reports for March (12 interventions), June (7 interventions), 
September (16 interventions) and December (12 interventions) 2013; available at 
http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work/reports.page (accessed 5 April 2018). 
124 Two interventions are estimated to cost £1.8 million because of the size of the firms involved (SRA ‘SRA  
seeks  solution  to increased interventions’ costs’ 10 May 2013; available at 
https://www.richardnelsonllp.co.uk/sra-seeks-solution-to-increased-interventions-costs (accessed 18 March 
2018). For the cost of compensation fund pay outs to claimants, see page 3 of the SRA Regulatory Outcomes 
Reports for March (£3.45 million), June (£5.69 million), September (£2.72 million) and December (£5.15 
million) 2013; available at http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work/reports.page (accessed 5 April 2018).  
125 SRA Annual Review 2015/16, above n 54, p 39.  
126 Ibid, p 41. 
127 See Sklar, et al, above n 114, who suggested that complaints data should be used as an active part of 
regulatory strategy. 
128 Conclusions regarding propensity for misconduct assume the adequacy of detection measures and 
consistency of prosecution decisions.  
 
(a) Jurisdiction 
While the LSA ended the connection between the Law Society and the SDT, it did not 
change the disciplinary process itself or the structure and role of the tribunal. The advice of a 
preliminary report that the professions’ systems worked reasonably well and could be left to 
operate broadly as they were129 was heeded. The SDT therefore continues to be comprised of 
solicitors with at least ten years’ experience and lay members appointed by a senior judge, the 
Master of the Rolls.130 Panels of three members hear charges against solicitors, recognised 
bodies, registered European lawyers or registered foreign lawyers. Also employers can be 
joined in applications against non-solicitor employees. Nearly all the cases the tribunal hears 
are against solicitors.131 The LSA required that the SDT be reconstituted as a company 
limited by guarantee, independent of, but funded by, The Law Society.132 It was also 
relatively free from control by the oversight regulator, the LSB; its only power in relation to 
the SDT was to approve rule changes proposed by the tribunal133 or to make orders enabling 
the tribunal to carry out its role more effectively or efficiently.134 It could give directions only 
where the tribunal failed to perform its functions to an adequate standard, or at all.135  
 
(b) Charges 
The SDT’s decisions refer to charges formulated by the SRA. These are based on breaches of 
rules current at the time that offences are committed. Therefore, respondents potentially face 
different charges covering different periods of regulation.136 Practice prior to the creation of 
the SRA Code of Conduct 2011 was to charge respondents with a breach of one of six core 
duties in the preamble to the Solicitors Practice Rules 1990, or the Solicitors Code of 
Conduct 2007, and with breaches of detailed rules in the code. After adoption of the 2011 
Code, and the shift from rules to outcomes, specific charges were only laid where there were 
breaches of the Solicitors Accounts Rules (SARs) or, for offences predating 2011, the old 
code of conduct. Where no rules applied, respondents were charged with a breach of the SRA 
Principles.137 As seen in Table 1, the most frequent charges based on the Principles were 
reducing public trust in the profession and failing to act with integrity. The least used charge 
was failure to run a practice so as to encourage equality and diversity. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE  
Table 2: Allegations of Breach of SRA Principles in 2015 
 
Rank Principle 
No.  
Principle Name Number of Times 
Breach of Principle 
Alleged 
Number of Times 
Breach of Principle 
Alleged (%)  
1st 6  Maintaining Public Trust 83 23.8 
                                                 
129 Sir David Clementi, Review of the Regulatory Framework for legal Services in England and Wales: Final 
Report (2004) p 8, para 18. 
130 Solicitors Act 1974, s 46. 
131 In 2015, 132 respondents were solicitors, three were paralegals, two trainees, two firms and one legal was an 
executive. Therefore, non-solicitors made up approximately 6% of the total population. 
132 See LSA Schedule 16 Part 1, s.48, introducing s. 46A to the Solicitors Act 1974, and Solicitors Disciplinary 
Tribunal Administration Limited (SDTA Ltd) Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal Annual Report 2011-2012, p 10; 
available at http://www.solicitorstribunal.org.uk/about-us/annual-reports (accessed 20 October 2017).  
133 LSA s 178. 
134 Ibid, s 180. 
135 Ibid, s 179. 
136 Hannaford, above n 69.  
137 SRA Code of Conduct 2011; available at http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/code/content.page  
(accessed 17 October 2017). 
2nd 2  Integrity 75 21.5 
3rd 4  Acting in Client’s Interests 40 11.5 
4th 10  Client Money & Assets 34 9.7 
5th 7  Legal & Regulatory Obligations 32 9.2 
6th 5  Standards of service 27 7.7 
7th 8  Effective Business Governance, Finance 
& Management 
23 6.6 
8th 1  Rule of Law & Admin of Justice 22 6.3 
9th 3  Independence 11 3.2 
10th 9  Equality & Diversity 2 0.6 
  Totals 349 100% 
 
One of the difficulties with using Principles as a basis for misconduct charges is that despite 
their generality, they sometimes do not appear to cover specific misconduct. This problem is 
marked where respondents incur criminal convictions for offences having nothing to do with 
practice. In one case a respondent convicted of falsely nominating another driver for a 
speeding offence was charged with failing to uphold the rule of law and proper administration 
of justice (principle 1).138  
The difficulty in framing charges may have been caused because of a decision to omit a 
flexible ‘catch all’ charge from the Principles. This function was previously served by a duty 
to preserve the good repute of the legal profession. This was the core of the Bingham dictum 
in Bolton and one of five fundamental principles attached to the Solicitors Practice Rules 
1990. The Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007 adopted a reformulated principle; that solicitors 
should not behave in a way ‘likely to diminish the trust the public places in you or the 
profession’, the phraseology adopted in the SRA Principles 2011. Diminishing trust is less 
apposite than preserving reputation in cases where solicitors have been convicted of offences. 
Thus, charges of acting without integrity or failing to maintain public trust are not suitable in 
many cases involving convictions. Cases of drunken driving,139 making false claims for 
refunds on train tickets for train delays and cancellations140 and making indecent photographs 
of children141 are only a few examples of cases in which undermining public trust did not 
seem to accurately cover specific conduct. 
While professional repute is no longer a principle, the courts continue to maintain Lord 
Bingham’s assertion in Bolton that maintaining the reputation of the solicitors' profession is 
raison d’etre of professional discipline.142 The SDT also frequently refers to the reputation of 
the profession.143 In one decision it was considered the decisive factor.144 Problems in 
matching the Principles to specific misconduct were not limited to cases involving 
convictions.  In a case in which a solicitor had purchased an elderly client’s house at less than 
market value, the SRA dropped a charge of lack of integrity before the hearing.145 The 
                                                 
138 Mohammed Imran (11246-2014).  
139 Harte, above n 102 and Gail Evans (11285-2014).  
140 Nancy Josephine Lee (11362-2015).  
141 Hugh Alexander Jackson (11340-2015).  
142 Above, n 34 and see Richard John Tinkler v SRA and Others [2012] EWHC 3645 (Admin) [43].  
143 Ali, n 95 above, Imran, n 138 above and Mann & Bradford, above n 81. 
144 Jackson, above n 141. 
145 Nigel Guy De Laval Harvie (11257-2014).  
prosecution was only saved because the alleged offence had occurred when earlier rules, 
stating that a solicitor must not take unfair advantage for himself or a third party, applied.146  
Considerable difficulty has been caused by the absence of a Principle demanding honesty, the 
dishonesty of a respondent being the most significant conclusion the SDT reaches. 
Respondents accused of dishonesty are therefore charged with a breach of the Principle 
requiring integrity. The SDT has applied a judicial definition that states ‘… a person lacks 
integrity if he/she acts in a way which, although falling short of dishonesty, lacks moral 
soundness, rectitude and steady adherence to an ethical code’.147 Before 2011, the SRA’s 
practice was to attach an allegation of dishonesty or recklessness to specific charges. Post 
2011 the practice was to charge potentially dishonest respondents with lack of integrity while 
alleging dishonesty in relation to specific factual allegations, for example, dishonest use of 
client money.148 Such allegations were accompanied by the observation that it was not 
necessary to establish dishonesty to prove lack of integrity. In dishonesty cases the SDT 
applied the two stage test set out by the House of Lords in Twinsectra v Yardley.149 This 
involved asking whether conduct was dishonest according to the ordinary standards of 
reasonable and honest people and, if so, whether the respondent should have realised that his 
conduct was dishonest by those standards. Respondents cleared of dishonesty could still be 
found guilty of lack of integrity, which is generally treated as having only an objective 
element.150 This potentially caused confusion because a finding of lack of integrity without 
dishonesty is regarded as a lesser offence. 
 
In 2017 the proposition that solicitors might display lack of integrity without being dishonest 
was doubted in an appeal to the Administrative court.151 Mostyn J stated that lack of integrity 
inevitably involved dishonesty and argued that the SRA should not be able to ‘side-step the 
requirement of proving the subjective element of dishonesty in any case by the simple 
expedient of charging the same facts as want of integrity’. 152 The Divisional Court’s decision 
temporarily threw into doubt a distinction recognised since Bolton where a solicitor who had 
been reckless with client money was found not to have been dishonest. Perhaps fortunately, 
another Divisional Court, led by Sir Brian Leveson, confirmed that lack of integrity is indeed 
a lesser standard than dishonesty and simply a failure to reach the high standards demanded 
of a solicitor.153  
 
The simple expedient of adding a requirement for honesty to the list of principles would not 
answer a deeper question: does charging solicitors with breaches of very broad principles 
satisfy their human right to a fair trial? The most obvious requirement of a fair trial that 
current practice could offend is ‘to be informed promptly, in a language which he 
understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him’.154 This 
wording does not explicitly require that charges be made clear, but it is arguable that, unlike 
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in criminal trials, solicitors may often have little idea of the specific offence they have 
committed. The current situation arguably over relies on the SDT knowing misconduct when 
it sees it. 
 
(c) Proof 
One of the difficulties created by the SRA’s new sanctions is the articulation of the two 
disciplinary systems. In relation to the standard of proof for misconduct, for example, the 
SRA applies the civil standard of proof, the balance of probabilities, when deciding whether 
to rebuke or fine. The SDT uses the higher, criminal standard, beyond a reasonable doubt, in 
considering new cases and when reviewing SRA decisions on appeal. The fact that 
respondents can have a higher standard applied to the facts of their case encourages appeals 
and increases their chances of reversing an SRA decision. Historic support from the courts 
for the SDT’s use of the criminal standard155 has ebbed away following an SRA campaign for 
the SDT to use the civil standard in appeals and in disciplinary proceedings. 
This drew official approval,156 then government support.157 Finally, an influential bench in 
the High Court endorsed use of the civil standard across the board.158 No doubt as a result of 
this pressure, and in the light of a similar proposal by the Bar, the SDT has undertaken to 
consider the standard of proof in a forthcoming consultation on its rules.159  
   
(d) Intention 
One reason for the SDT’s insistence on the criminal standard of proof is that much of its 
caseload comprises dishonesty cases. Guidance from the courts suggests that a tribunal faced 
with a solicitor of ‘anything less than complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness… 
[should] almost invariably, no matter how strong the mitigation… [result in an] order that the 
solicitor be struck off’.160 Possibly because of the severity of the sanction a previous study of 
the SDT’s approach to dishonesty found that the SDT ‘…demonstrate[d] a practice of 
                                                 
155 Re A Solicitor [1993] QB 69 and Campbell v Hamlet [2005] UKPC 19. 
156 Insurance Fraud Taskforce: Final Report (January 2016); available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/494105/PU18
17_Insurance_Fraud_Taskforce.pdf (accessed 27 February 2017), Independent Review of Claims Management 
Regulation (March 2016) para. 9.7; available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/508160/PU19
18_claims_management_regulation_review_final.pdf (accessed 17 October 2017). 
157 J Hyde ‘SRA wants lower standard of proof for tribunal prosecutions’ LSG 20 January 2016; available at 
https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/sra-wants-lower-standard-of-proof-for-tribunal-prosecutions/5053131.article 
(accessed 16 October 2017).  
158 See, The Solicitors Regulation Authority v Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal [2016] EWHC 2862 (Admin) an 
appeal concerning a non-solicitor immigration advisor reinstated by the SDT after the SRA banned him from 
working for a regulated firm. Leggatt J and Sir Brian Leveson, the President of the Queen’s Bench Division, 
declared that the SDT should apply the civil standard when hearing appeals against SRA decisions, and possibly 
across the board. See also J Hyde ‘Re-think SDT Standard of Proof–Leveson’ LSG 11 November 2016; 
available at https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/rethink-sdt-standard-of-proof--leveson/5058766.article (accessed 
17 October 2017) and Legal Futures ‘High Court: Time to consider lowering burden of proof in the Solicitors 
Disciplinary Tribunal’ 11 November 2016; available at https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/high-court-
time-consider-lowering-burden-proof-solicitors-disciplinary-tribunal (accessed 20 October 2017) 
159 See Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal Response to Bar Standards Board 
Consultation—Review of the Standard of Proof Applied in Professional Misconduct Proceedings (Solicitors 
Disciplinary Tribunal, July 2017); available at http://www.solicitorstribunal.org.uk/sites/default/files-
sdt/SDT%20Response%20-%20BSB%20Consultation%2020.07.17.pdf (accessed 17 October 2017).  
160 Per Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Bolton, above n 34, pp 518a-519b.  
negotiating reality in which the dishonesty rule is circumvented by applying a different 
label’.161  
 
Our sample contained several cases in which the SDT might have found dishonesty but did 
not. In one of these the tribunal doubted the respondent’s evidence but refused to make a 
finding of dishonesty because dishonesty was not alleged in the charges.162 In another, a 
respondent who had transferred money from client account to office account, knowing that 
this would leave a shortfall, was found to have been reckless but not dishonest.163 In yet 
another case, the dishonesty of a respondent who had persuaded someone to accept his 
speeding points was excused because it was ‘of short duration’.164 In a case where a 
respondent created a false email trail to conceal a failure to list a case for hearing, the SDT 
accepted that he thought he was recreating emails that had existed.165 Applying the subjective 
limb of the Twinsectra formula it found that he had not realised that ordinary people would 
regard this behaviour as dishonest. The SDT also accepted medical evidence negating 
dishonest intent.166 In one such case it accepted a regulatory settlement proposed by the SRA 
because medical evidence called into question whether there was ‘dishonesty to the level of 
proof required’.167   
 
In cases involving women the SDT’s generous interpretation of behaviour suggests the 
possibility of chivalry bias; in this context a failure to treat women the same as men in 
relation to similar offences.168 One woman charged with a dishonest accounts rule breaches 
was found not to be dishonest, or lacking integrity, but guilty of ‘sloppiness and 
misunderstandings’.169 In another case a respondent had got behind in a number of personal 
injury files. She made false time recordings, forged letters and medical reports and made 
‘interim payment’ and supplemented damages out of other clients’ funds to prevent 
complaints.170 The SDT found that the SRA had not established beyond reasonable doubt that 
her conduct was dishonest, being convinced by her “…truly compelling and exceptional 
mitigation [it concluded that she] …had not been thinking rationally at the time and had not 
given any thought at all to the question of dishonesty. She had simply been trying to keep her 
head above water in extremely difficult circumstances.”171 In a case in which a woman 
respondent failed to warn a mortgage lender client of possible mortgage fraud the transcript 
noted that the ‘tribunal had the benefit of hearing R give lengthy oral evidence clearly under 
considerable stress’.172  
 
Although lack of integrity could be seen as a lesser charge, findings of lack of integrity were 
not lightly made. In one case the SDT decided respondents involved in numerous deliberate 
breaches were only ‘reckless to the point of lacking integrity’ because they believed that 
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monies withdrawn from client account were covered by monies due.173 In another, a family 
lawyer, dabbling in a purchase for a conveyancing client, failed to alert the mortgage lender 
for whom he was also acting of a risk of mortgage fraud. 174  The SDT felt that he was a 
grossly incompetent conveyancer and did not have sufficient awareness of practice in the area 
for the conduct to lack integrity. The misconduct predated the SRA Principles 2011 and this 
was another case where the respondent was found guilty of breaches of the relevant code, the 
Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007.  
 
Appeals by the SRA to the High Court perhaps suggest that it does not accept the SDT’s 
standards. A decision of the SDT not to strike a dishonest solicitor from the Roll was 
reversed by the Court of Appeal with the admonition that striking off should follow all but 
minor findings of dishonesty.175 In two recent cases involving alleged dishonest use of client 
money the SRA obtained rulings from the High Court quashing some or all of SDT decisions 
favourable to respondents.176 Of the 105 cases in 2015, seven were subject to appeal, four by 
the respondents and three by the SRA. All of the respondents’ appeals were dismissed177 
whereas the SRA succeeded in one of its appeals,178 had another dismissed179 and partially 
succeeded in the third.180  
 
 
(e) Sanctions 
The SDT tended not to impose multiple sanctions. Thus, while one respondent received a fine 
and a prohibition order,181 as shown in Table 6, the total number of sanctions imposed 
matched the number of respondents. As the Table also shows, striking off and suspension 
accounted for nearly 55% of SDT actions.  
 
Table 3: INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE (SDT Cases 2015 Total Sanctions—footnote 
182 to be inserted after the title of the table 182) 
 
Table 3: SDT Cases 2015 Total Sanctions 
Sanctions Number % 
Struck Off 56 39.4 
Suspension (Indefinite) 3 2.1 
Suspension (Fixed Period) 12 8.5 
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Fine 33 23.2 
Reprimand 8 5.6 
Prohibition Order  1  0.7 
Revocation of s.43 Order—refused  1 0.7 
s.43 Clerk Order 2 1.4 
(Application for) Restoration to the Role Refused 3 2.1 
(Application for) Restoration to the Role Granted 1 0.7 
(Application for) Determination of Indefinite Suspension (refused) 1 0.7 
Conditions Imposed on Practice Cert 12 8.5 
Application for Removal of Condition on PC (granted) 1 0.7 
Application for Rehearing (refused)  1 0.7 
No Order, Costs Only Order or Case Dismissed 7 4.9 
TOTAL 142 100 
 
 
In the sample considered the most likely circumstances for striking off occurred when 
solicitors were found to have dishonestly used client funds, particularly substantial sums.183 
A few respondents found to lack integrity were struck off without a finding of dishonesty.184 
In one of these a solicitor involved in miss-applying investment funds was found to have 
been “duped” by a client,185 and may not have appreciated that she was facilitating a fraud, 
but was nevertheless struck off.186 Deliberately ‘borrowing’ client money, even without a 
finding of dishonesty, also led to striking off.187 In general, however, a finding that a solicitor 
lacked integrity but was not dishonest led to a lesser sanction. 
 
The second group most likely to be struck off were those convicted by courts of serious 
criminal offences. In one of the most serious examples a respondent had ferried messages 
from suspected drug dealers under arrest and a suspect still at large.188  He was convicted at 
Crown Court on three counts of possession of cocaine and attempting to pervert the course of 
justice. Another respondent was struck off for dishonesty convictions acquired before 
embarking on a legal career; claiming refunds on five train tickets for which a court had fined 
her £711.11.189 Another had not had a practising certificate since 2009, but was struck off 
following conviction of drunk driving and other offences, including claiming false expenses 
from the Law Society.190  
 
The conclusion that striking off was the most serious sanction was not true in all cases. The 
removal of the cap on the SDT’s fining powers made a fine the most appropriate sanction in 
some circumstances. This was demonstrated in Harvie.191 Since the respondent had retired 
from practice, striking off or suspension was potentially a less significant sanction than the 
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£305,000 fine imposed; the difference between the respondent’s outlay and the probate value 
of the deceased client’s house he had purchased. Additionally, the order to pay £37,016 costs 
ensured he was substantially out of pocket. At the other end of the scale a solicitor who called 
another solicitor ‘a complete plonker’ was reprimanded and ordered to pay costs of £2,600.192 
This was only slightly more than the SRA’s maximum fine, but the SDT declared the 
proceedings justified because of other factors.193 This decision reflected the fact that 
respondents who admitted all or some of the charges against them and demonstrated what the 
SDT called ‘genuine insight’,194 a recognition of failings combined with remorse, were likely 
to benefit from a more positive interpretation of conduct and less onerous sanctions.  
 
Banning solicitors from practice contributed 55% of the SDT’s disposals and fines a further 
25%. The maximum fine imposed was £305,000 and the minimum £500. Fines to a total 
value £521,500, were imposed in 33 cases; an average of nearly £16,000 per case. Costs 
orders were invariably made against respondents. Although the SRA could be ordered to pay 
costs it was protected by the tribunal’s propensity to recognise a public interest in 
encouraging prosecution. The total value of costs awarded over the period was £1,742,530, 
imposed against 115 respondents; an average per case of £15,152. These figures suggest that 
further increasing the SRA’s power to fine, even to £20,000, would reduce the SDT’s 
caseload without a significant loss in terms of solicitors’ rights. Indeed, many would be saved 
from paying costs almost as severe as the average fine. The cases of failure to obtain PII are 
good example of this. Most of the cases resulted from impecuniosity and in only two were the 
respondent’s failures part of a larger and more serious allegation.195 In these cases one 
respondent was struck off and the other was suspended and fined.196 In the PII cases where 
no dishonesty was involved, respondents were fined (five cases), reprimanded (two cases) or 
suspended (two cases). In some of these cases the SDT expressed doubt about the decision to 
refer the case to it.197     
 
It is not possible to provide any definitive statistical analysis on the SDT’s treatment of 
BAME respondents in our 2015 sample.198 However, the John Report,199 found significant 
differences in the imposition of sanctions on BAME solicitors compared to their white 
counterparts. This was demonstrated most starkly in relation to sanctions imposed for 
breaches of the Solicitors’ Account Rules (SAR). Here, white solicitors (47.8%) were more 
likely to be reprimanded than BAME solicitors (21.2%).200 The most frequent sanction 
against BAME for SAR breaches was a fine (26.3%).201 Where a solicitor was suspended for 
breach of account rules, that solicitor was almost five times more likely to be of BAME 
origin (21%) than white (4%).202 Overall, the greatest variation in the use of sanctions 
generally was in relation to the imposition of conditions on practice certificates, at 20% for 
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BAME and 7.5% for whites.203 The report called for the SDT to monitor its outcomes by 
respondents’ ethnicity and gender204 but the outcome has not been reported. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The LSA began a phase of deregulation in the legal services market which has not yet 
concluded. One of its most dramatic impacts was to end professional self-regulation. The 
result has been a gradual erosion of other indicators of professionalism. The SRA will shortly 
implement plans to allow solicitors to work in unregulated entities, subject to a code of 
conduct but not necessarily offering other protections of professionalism. 205 In response the 
Law Society asks whether solicitors will use this opportunity to set themselves up as 
unregulated providers because of the benefits of operating without regulation.206 One 
implication is that solicitors struck from the roll will reappear as owners or workers in a 
burgeoning alternative legal sector. The LSB has declared that the deregulatory steps 
facilitated by the Act will soon reach the limits of the current legislative framework, calling 
for ‘more fundamental revision.’207 It claims that the incremental impact of deregulatory 
initiatives represents a huge shift away from old ways of working towards a better regulated 
system that is focused on managing risks and delivering better outcomes for all consumers.208 
 
In a deregulated legal services sector, it would make perfect sense to place more 
responsibility for the conduct of lawyers on their employers. Data from the regulatory system 
throw some light on whether such a shift in direction might be successful. The decreased 
number of cases reaching the SDT could be evidence of a decline in serious misconduct or 
that the SRA is operating a so-called ‘regulatory funnel’, like professional SROs, and 
filtering out the cases before they reach disciplinary hearings.209 Both of these notions are 
countered by the large number of alternative disposals. Many of these presumably involve 
less serious cases which may not previously have involved a disciplinary sanction. The fact 
that they now do, can be claimed as evidence of the additional reach of the new system. 
Proportionality in handling these cases could be claimed as evidence of more effective 
regulation; reinforcing governmentality by heightening the sense of surveillance. Similarly, 
we speculate that the large proportion of the cases that appear to result from self and firm 
referrals (31 of the 105 cases or 30%) may be due to the new compliance posts and reporting 
regulations in the SRA Handbook.210 This may be claimed as a benefit of a new culture of 
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managerial responsibility and management of the self. This can also be seen as evidence of an 
element of governmentality; what Foucault called ‘the conduct of conduct’. 211   
 
Our data also highlights the limits of governmentality achieved through the logic of corporate 
bureaucracy, which relies on organisational structure to control behaviour. In 2015, over 
4,000 sole practices and 8,885, 2-4 partner firms employed over 30% of all practitioners.212 
Around 80% of respondents before the SDT in that period were from such firms. When they 
were from larger firms, more than one member of the firm was often involved in misconduct. 
Regulation dependent on organisational structure is constrained in dealing with this reality. 
There is not much point insisting on a compliance officer for conduct if that person is the one 
involved in wrongdoing. One obvious solution, prescribing a larger minimum size of firm, 
would ensure a chance of establishing ethical infrastructure. Another, preventing small units 
operating in areas handling large sums of client money, would minimise risk. Both of these 
may exacerbate a problem of access to legal services213 impeding the regulatory objectives of 
promoting competition and the consumer interest. They could also be detrimental to diversity 
in the legal profession as it is predominantly BAME solicitors who populate small firms.214 
The alternative being urged by government and their regulators is further deregulation. The 
evidence points to a contrary conclusion; there is arguably a need for the SRA to increase its 
use of random audits as a means of improving risk identification, controlling lawyer 
misconduct and closing down firms who fail to comply with the rules. 215 Random audits may 
also have a ‘ripple effect’ on lawyer compliance behaviour.216 
 
The final step in the decline of the ideology of professionalism in legal services regulation 
would involve eliminating the SDT. This is the predictable consequence of the growth in the 
numbers of solicitors.  In the decade before Bolton v The Law Society, in which Bingham MR 
expressed reverence for the reputation of the profession, the number of practising solicitors in 
England and Wales grew by a little over 28%, from 45,732 to 63,628.217  In 2015, there were 
over 133,000 practitioners, nearly 80% working in 9,403 solicitors’ firms.218 The difficult 
task of regulating such a large group across so many sites is compounded by the diversity of 
the modes, styles and sizes of solicitors’ practices. The preparation and presentation of cases 
to the SDT compound the resource problems in confronting these difficulties.  
 
The shrinking number of cases the SDT handles, and the fact that around 70% of the sums 
paid by respondents comprised costs and only 30% fines, raises the issue of whether it offers 
a proportional response to the problem of solicitor misconduct. If the SDT did not exist, 
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however, there would still need to be a system for excluding solicitors guilty of serious 
misconduct. One solution would be for the SRA to deal with low level misconduct, leaving 
dishonesty offences to be tried by the courts.219 An arguably more efficient system would 
enable the SRA to take all disciplinary actions, including striking off, subject to the 
protection of an appeals system. Such a step was recently recommended in a Treasury report 
alongside a recommendation that the criminal standard of proof be abandoned.220 
 
There are several counter arguments to further de-regulation. Rule of law and fair trial 
principles support the use of independent tribunals in hearing cases against lawyers. The risk 
of increasing the level of state involvement in the practice and discipline aspects of regulation 
was illustrated recently by a high-profile prosecution of members of a leading human rights 
firm presenting compensation claims arising from alleged abuse by armed forces in Iraq.221 
The respondents were acquitted amid claims that the decision to prosecute was influenced by 
government pressure.222 As a result, the SRA plans to publish an enforcement policy 
clarifying when and why it brings proceedings.223 This may not have followed had it been the 
sole arbiter of misconduct. Another consideration is that the SDT may be better able to deal 
effectively with financial misconduct than courts. This is because the strict requirements of 
the SAR impose a higher standard than might be enforced using criminal law.224 A final 
consideration is that the tribunal process publicly exposes possible failings in practice 
regulation. These may not come to light where the regulator is the sole judge of misconduct. 
 
One option that will undoubtedly be considered in the next wave of legal services reform is 
creation of a single tribunal to hear misconduct cases against all regulated lawyers. Such a 
body could be established independently but given a remit clarifying the regulatory standards 
and methods to be promoted.225  This would be an opportunity to explore a different 
procedural basis for hearings, including replacing the current adversarial format with an 
inquisitorial approach.226 It should enable re-examination of the central priorities of 
discipline, whether consumer interests, professional reputation or public trust.227 It is also 
possible that the next review will lead to further steps towards competition as the dominant 
logic of regulation.228 In that case, the Act will be seen to have actually served a hidden 
purpose; to act as a bridge to the de-professionalisation of the legal services market. 
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